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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationships between monetary  wage and 
its theoretical explanatory variables using a Structural Time Series 
(STS)  model  in  order  to  take  into  account  the  unobserved 
components  (trend,  cycle,  seasonal  and  irregular)  of  wage. 
Theoretically,  the  monetary  wage  is  negatively  related  to  labor 
productivity and unemployment rate but positively to the consumer 
price index and foreign prices. Our empirical results for a small open 
economy as Luxembourg indicate that the wage is positively related 
to the consumer price index and foreign prices as predicted by the 
theory,  but  the  labor  productivity  and  unemployment  rate  are  not 
significant in the explanation of wages dynamics in the Luxembourg 
economy. 
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1. Introduction 
     Wage  formation  derives  from  a  theoretical  model  of  wage 
bargaining  both  on  an  atomistic  labor  market  and  an  imperfect 
market  of  goods  (see  Layard  and  Nickell  1986,  Blanchard  and 
Kiyotaki  1987,  Manning  1993,  Lockwood  and  Manning  1993). 
Aggregate  prices  and  wages  are  thus  given  or  exogenous  for 
economic agents. 
 
     The formulation of the wage bargaining is based first on firms 
profit  maximization  program  and  second  on  consumers  utility 
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maximization  subject  to  their  budget  constraint.  This  process  has 
been analyzed by several authors including Holden (1999), Pétursson 
and  Slok  (2001),  Pétursson  (2002),  Nymoen  and  Rodseth  (2003), 
Nymoen (2003). 
 
The bargaining of wage proceeds from the consumers’ behavior 
through  their  labor  unions  trying  to  maximize  the  utility  of  their 
members by expecting the highest wage, and from the behavior of 
firms, which try to get the lowest wage. Wage bargaining between 
labor union and firms is being established as the common process of 
wage  setting  in  most  European  countries.  Various  approaches  are 
possible but we follow here the line of Pétursson and Slok (2001), 
and Pétursson (2002), which allows determining both the wage rate 
and the level of employment in the economy. 
 
Our main empirical findings in the  case  of a very small  open 
economy like Luxembourg, where the bargaining process applies, are 
that the wage is positively related to the consumer price index and 
foreign prices, but labor productivity and unemployment rate are not 
significant at explaining the wage dynamics. While a 10% increase 
in foreign prices results in a 1.10% increase in wage, a 10% increase 
the consumer price index results in a 2.90% increase in the wage. It 
clearly appears that although the consumer price index and foreign 
prices are both significant in the explanation of the wage dynamics, 
the consumer price index and most importantly historical wages are 
the  main  variables  impacting  current  wages  in  Luxembourg 
economy.  
In the rest of the paper Section 2 presents the model of wage 
formation  extended  in  section  3  with  structural  time  series 
components.  Section  4  presents  the  estimation  results  for 
Luxembourg and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A Model of Wage Formation 
The Behavior of Consumers 
The economy is composed of k consumers and in the case of a 
small  open  economy  most  of  consumers  are  non-resident.  Each 
household h has a utility function U expressed as: Aka, B.F., Pieretti,P.           Wage Dynamics in A Structural Model for Luxembourg 
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with  ih C   the  level  of  the  household’s  consumption  being  a  CES 
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where  1     represents  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between 
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The consumers’ budget constraint is given by  
k
i h ih i W C P
1 , 
with  the  variable  h W   indicating  the  nominal  revenue  of  the 
consumer. 
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Plugging the demand of goods  i C  in the utility function  h U  we get 
the indirect utility function  h J  of the consumer h: 

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An individual does decide to work if the indirect utility 0  h J , 
and doesn’t work if 0  h J . He will be indifferent when 0  h J . 
 
The behavior of Firms 
For a given  wage rate, the  domestic producer’s problem  is to 
maximize its profit noted: 
i i i i i N W Y PR              (7) 
taking into account the technology used for production, the demand 
of goods to its firm and the market conditions i i Y C  . The variable Yi 
represents the quantity of goods i, and PRi is the producer price of 
the good i.  
Setting the production function here to a Cobb-Douglas type: 
   
1
i i i N AK Y           (8) 
the first order conditions of the profit maximization problem give the 
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which  is,  assuming  symmetrically  that  Yi=Y,  Ni=N,  Wi=W  and 













d ,           (11) 
When wages have been fixed by profit maximization, the firm 
fixes unilaterally the level of employment. 
 
The Behavior of Labor Unions 
There are m labor unions composed of l workers in the economy. 
The objective of a labor union is to maximize the expected utility of 
each of its members. The utility of a worker who is member of a 
union is given by the indirect utility function of the consumer: Aka, B.F., Pieretti,P.           Wage Dynamics in A Structural Model for Luxembourg 
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while the utility  function  of a  member  loosing  its job  is  j U . The 



























           (13) 
with  j N  representing the number of employees in the sector j, and 
the ratio  j j l N  indicates thus the proportion of employees in the sector 
j.  
The  objective  function  j T of  labour  unions  is  obtained  by  (i) 
replacing  Eq.  (12)  in  the  expected  utility  function  Eq.  (13),  (ii) 
subtracting  j U and  (iii)  multiplying  the  whole  by  the  number  of 





























































1         (15) 
Nominal  wages  are  fixed  as  solution  of  the  Nash  bargaining 
between profit maximizing firms (trying to get the lowest wage) and 
labour unions trying to maximize the utility of their members (by 
getting  the  highest  wage).  Here  wage  is  the  unique  object  of 
negotiation  (« Right  To  Manage »  model)
3.  The  solution  of  the 
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where  j   indicates the profit of  each  firm and the parameter    
indicates the negotiation power of unions. Solving this program gives 
the  wage rate that maximizes the preceding Nash negotiation (see 
appendix A2). 
 
The  log  linear  solution  can  be  written  finally  (see  Péturson, 
2002): 
, 0 , 1 , 0 ) 1 (                  w r u z p p w   (17) 
where w is the nominal wage rate,  r p  the producer price,  p  the 
consumer  price  index,  z=(y-n)  labour  productivity,  u  the 
unemployment rate, and  w  representing all other terms affecting the 
result  of  the  negotiation  (tax  rate,  level  of  skilled  labor,  labor 








(with  q  indicating  foreign  prices)  we  get  the  following  wage 
equation: 
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  (18) 
This equation of the general form: 
 
0 4 3 2 1           u z q p w          (19) 
 
can  be  found  in  various  empirical  works  and  has  been  used  to 
describe wage formation in several sectors of the economy. 
 
3.  An  Extended  Structural  Time  Series  Model  of  the  Wage 
Equation 
 
The stochastic formulation of a structural time series (STS) model 
for the logarithm of wage denoted  t w with explanatory variables is 
the following: Aka, B.F., Pieretti,P.           Wage Dynamics in A Structural Model for Luxembourg 
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t t t
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1 1           (20) 
where  t   is the trend,  t   is the cyclical component, and  t   the 
irregular component, all assumed to be stochastic. The parameter  t   
is the slope of the trend component. The stochastic properties of the 
level and the slope are driven by  t   and t  . 
The  seasonal  (cyclical)  component  in  trigonometric  form,  see 
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(for  T t s j , , 1 , 2 / , , 2 , 1     ) where  s j j / 2    is the frequency in 
radians and    is the damping factor ( 1 0    ). 
Combining Eq. (18) or (19) with Eq. (20), we get the following 
extended stochastic specification: 
t t t t t w u z q p w                 1 4 3 2 1   (23) 
where  1  ,  2  ,  3  ,  4  and   are real coefficients. Eq. (23) can be 
estimated to see which of these components explains much the wage 
dynamics. The results of the estimated model for Luxembourg are 
presented in the next section. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
     
     The  model  in  Eq.  (23)  is  estimated  using  STAMP  6.02  (see 
Koopman, Harvey, Doornik and Shepard, 2000). The quarterly data International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies   Vol. 5-2 (2008) 
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used  are  provided  by  the  STATEC
4  (Luxembourg)  and  cover  the 
period 1995:1-2005:4. Figure 1 shows the time series in level (left 
panel) and first difference (right panel). We can notice that the data 
show a non-constant upward trend over time. 
 
We tested the various models for combination of level and slope 
characteristics for seasonal dummies and for trigonometric dummies. 
The results not furnished here have shown that the seasonal dummies 
models  with  no  level  and  no  slope  are  better  than  trigonometric 
dummies models in terms of Log-likelihood. The synthetic results for 
seasonal  dummies  models  (see  Table  1)  indicate  that  models  3 
overcome  others.  In  effect  the  log-Likelihood  of  model  3  is  the 
highest and we therefore choose this model in the rest of the paper. 
 
In fact examining the Figure of residuals of Model 1 we see that 
there  are  outliers.  We  therefore  included  irregular  components  in 
Model 1 giving Model 2 and estimate again. The Log-likelihood of 
Model 2 appears lower than Model 1.  
 
In fact we could notice that among the explanatory variables the 
coefficient  of  unemployment  is  not  significant.  Thus  we  removed 
this variable from the model 2 and estimated it again. The final result 
(model  3)  with  higher  log-Likelihood  (158.848,  see  Table  1) 
indicates that all remaining explanatory variables are significant in 
terms  of  t-value  (see  Table  4).  The  final  model  includes  impulse 
dummies  at  appropriate  outlier  dates.  This  model  is  the  most 
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Figure 1: Level and first difference of variables 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (Model selection) Wage 
Models  Components 
Log-
Likelihood 
  Level  Slope  Variables  Irregular   
With Dummy Seasonal 
1:   No  No  Expl.   Irregular  156.648 
2:   No  No  Expl.   Irregular  152.156 
3:   No   No  Expl.   Irregular  158.848 
 
Table 2: Estimated variances of disturbances Wage 
(Sample: 1995. 2 - 2005. 4) (T = 43) 
Components  LSALM  (q-ratio) 
Model 3 
Irregular  0.0079877  (1.0000) 
Seasonal  0.0010811  (0.1353) Aka, B.F., Pieretti,P.           Wage Dynamics in A Structural Model for Luxembourg 
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Table 3: Estimated coefficients of final state vector 
(Sample: 1995. 2 - 2005. 4) (T = 43) 
Variables  Coefficient  R.m.s.e.  t-value 
Model 3 
Sea_1  0.15129  0.0070320  21.515 
Sea_2  -0.050327  0.0032566  -15.454 
Sea_3  0.01615  0.0041544  3.8875 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated coefficients of explanatory variables 
(Sample: 1995. 2 - 2005. 4) (T = 43) 





Irr 1999. 4 
Irr 2002. 1 



















Note: LSALM (log of wage); LP_CFIN (log of CPI);  
LP_XBSEU12 (log of foreign prices) 
 
 
Figure 2: Residual of Wage Model 3 
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Figure 3: Estimated Component of the Wage 












Estimates of explanatory variables in the final state vector show 
that the one-lag wage, the consumer price index and foreign prices 
are significant in the explanation of the wage behaviour (Table 4). 
The wage increases with the consumer price index and with foreign 
prices. An increase of 10% in the consumer price index results in 
2.90% increase in the wage rate, while a 10% increase in foreign 
prices results in 1.10% increase in the wage rate. 
 
Wage  dynamics  in  Luxembourg  are  mainly  explained  by  the 
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Figure 4: Post-Sample Prediction of CPI (Model 10) 





2.7 F-LSALM  Forecast 









     This  paper  analyzes  the  wage  dynamics  in  Luxembourg  along 
with its unobserved components using a structural time series (STS) 
model. Theoretically the  open  economy  model of  wage formation 
where unions and firms bargain wage on an atomistic labour market 
and  an  imperfect  market  of  goods  show  that  an  increase  in  the 
consumer price index, in foreign prices and in the labour productivity 
leads to an increase in wages. But an increase in unemployment leads 
to a decrease in wage rate.  
 
We find empirically that monetary wage is positively related to 
the consumer price index and historical wages and to foreign prices, 
unemployment rate and real labour productivity are not significant in 
the behaviour of monetary wages in Luxembourg. A 10% increase in 
foreign prices results in a 1.10% increase in the wage, but a 10% 
increase  in  the  consumer  price  index  results  in  2.9%  increase  of 
wages. More importantly, historical wages account for 78% of the 
evolution of current wages. 
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APPENDICES 
A1:  The first order condition is: 
0 ) 1 (    

  
i i i i W AK N PR
N
         (A1.1) 
i i i i W PR AK N  
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we form the Lagrangian: 
d
j i N T L  
             (A2.2) 
in log:   N T L log log log log log            (A2.3) 
The first order conditions of the negotiation problem give (in derivative 
log): 
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Each derivative element gives: 
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Replacing each derivative with its value in (A2.4) we get: International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies   Vol. 5-2 (2008) 
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representing  respectively  the  elasticity  of  profit  and  labor  demand  with 
respect to wage gives 
 
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 N , and the wage rate which maximizes the Nash 
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          (A2.15) 
The  wage  is  a  markup  over  the  various  wages  j U .  For  the chosen 
production function, setting the share of wage in the profit as  












S           (A2.16) 
with Y/N=Z the productivity of labour and PR/P=V the gap between the 
producer price and the consumer price, elasticities of the profit function and 
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The equilibrium of the model is obtained by finding the value of
j U . At 


























W u U ) ( ) ( 1 1     (A2.19) 
i.e. a weighted mean of the probability to find a job in another sector, given 
by the real wage (W/P) and the probability to remain unemployed given by 
the real benefit of unemployment (B/P), i.e. the compensation received by 
an employee which looses its job. The weights are given by the probability 
of not being re-employed  ) (u   which depends on the unemployment rate u 
in the economy and on the real advantages related to unemployment (B/P). 
Replacing U  with its value in Eq. (A2.15) we get: 
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The employment equation in obtained by log linearization of  Aka, B.F., Pieretti,P.           Wage Dynamics in A Structural Model for Luxembourg 
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, variables with 
asterix representing the equilibrium values. The log linear solution can be 
written: 
, 0 , 1 , 0 ) 1 (                  w r u z p p w              (A2.39) 
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